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Introduction
It was just three days before Christmas when James Bernard
Campbell came into the Reverend Bosler's home and brutally mur-
dered the Reverend and critically injured his daughter Sue Zann.1
Sue Zann Bosler stood terrified and helpless as this total stranger
stabbed her father twenty-four times, and then stabbed her six
times, leaving them both for dead.2 Sue Zann's father died, but,
miraculously, she survived and now must live everyday with the
painful memories and physical scars of this gruesome crime.3
A jury convicted Campbell of murder in the first degree.4 At the
sentencing hearing, the judge informed the jury that the sentence
could be either death or life imprisonment. Sue Zann took the
stand to give a victim impact statement, as permitted by Florida
law, which would inform the jury about her own life and the life
her father lived.6 She gave "deep," "dramatic," and "emotionally
moving" testimony.7 In short, Sue Zann was the prosecution's
"blockbuster witness," who, through her wrenching testimony,
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1999. B.A., English, Col-
lege of the Holy Cross, 1996. The author extends her sincere gratitude to Professor
Daniel Richman for his guidance, suggestions, and keen insight. She also would like
to thank her family and friends for their unconditional love, patience and support.
1. See 48 Hours: My Father's Killer (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 2, 1997) (not-
ing that the crime occurred on December 22, 1968) [hereinafter 48 Hours].
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. Id. With tears streaming down her face, she described the savage murder and
the pain she endured. See id. Between tears, she relayed to the jury how the stabbing
resulted in taking the side and part of her brain out of her skull. See id.
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helped secure the death penalty.8 Two courts, however, subse-
quently reversed the sentence on technicalities. 9
Meanwhile, over the past ten years, Sue Zann Bosler has be-
come the person most determined to keep Campbell alive."° At
the third sentencing hearing in ten years, Sue Zann again took the
stand, but under significantly different circumstances. 1' In a valiant
effort to uphold the beliefs of her father, who opposed the death
penalty, Sue Zann was determined to see peace prevail. 12 While
her prior testimony was "deep and eloquent," this time it was "as
unsympathetic and undramatic as possible."' 3 In response to the
prosecution's question about her livelihood, Sue Zann explained
that she has two jobs: one as a hairstylist and one as an advocate
8. Id.
9. See id.; see also Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1990) (vacating death
penalty and remanding for resentencing on grounds that the court should have con-
sidered in mitigation the fact that Campbell suffered from impaired capacity and had
a deprived and abusive childhood); Campbell v. State, 679 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1996) (re-
versing death sentence and remanding for third resentencing, holding that Campbell
was denied a fair penalty hearing because the prosecutor improperly discredited the
defense psychologist and made improper comments to the jury).
10. See 48 Hours, supra note 1. "Despite what has happened, she sees James
Campbell not as a monster, but as a human being." Id. In fact, Sue Zann has become
a leading voice in the movement against the death penalty, traveling nationwide with
a group called "Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation," in an effort to enlist
support and encouragement for the movement, as well as Campbell. Id. "It has be-
come her cause, almost her obsession," to save not only Campbell, but every single
person on death row. Id.
11. See id.
12. See id. Sue Zann Bosler recalled how her father once had told her that if he
were to be murdered he still would not want the defendant to be put to death; for,
more than anything, he desired peace on earth. See id.
13. Id. No longer did she clutch a tissue and wipe her tears; rather, she remained
calm and collective. See id. She referred to the defendant as "James" or "the gen-
tleman," as she coldly and abruptly responded to the prosecution's questions about
the crime. Id. "It was deliberate - she had an agenda," noted the prosecutor, who
described Sue Zann's victim impact statement to be a different testimony entirely,
with a different Sue Zann." Id.
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against the death penalty. 14 In only three hours the jury returned a
sentence of life imprisonment.15
A comparison of Sue Zann's remarkably different testimonies
reveals the role emotions can play in capital sentencing, and how
significantly they can prejudice the defendant's constitutional
rights. When Sue Zann expressed pain and torment, Campbell re-
ceived the death penalty; however, upon manipulating her testi-
mony so as to maintain a calm and distant appearance, Campbell
received only life imprisonment. Unlike Sue Zann, however, most
victims support the death penalty.'6 In fact, in today's society, vic-
tims are often the driving force behind the prosecution's push for a
death sentence,' 7 and it is their tears and painful recollections that
14. See id. While Florida law does permit the use of victim impact statements in
capital sentencing hearings, the State has made clear the prohibition against any opin-
ions regarding the death penalty of life imprisonment. See id.; see also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1997). Despite this restriction by the state, Sue Zann still
managed to find a loophole through which she could express her beliefs. But, when
she was called back to the stand by the defense, the judge was skeptical about letting
her proceed. See 48 Hours, supra note 1. He sent the jury out and ordered Sue Zann
to tell him what she planned to say. See id. In response, she asserted that she wanted
to forgive James. See id. Moreover, she commented, "I respect his life and value it
here on this earth, and I believe in life." Id. The judge ruled that such opinions have
no place in the courtroom and are not allowed under Florida law. See id. As such,
the defense found no room to call Sue Zann as a witness.
15. See id. Sue Zann's determination to save Campbell's life ended in victory, not
only for herself and Campbell, but also for the movement. In retrospect, she believes
this final sentencing gave her the closure she so desired and her own life a new begin-
ning. See id. But, while that is indeed heart-warming, that was not what our court-
rooms were designed for. The purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to heal the
wounds of the victim, but to punish the offender. Oftentimes the two may coincide,
but that cannot be the sole mission of justice.
16. See Tom Morganthau, Condemned to Life, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1995, at 19
(reporting that only 17% of those questioned in a random poll oppose the death pen-
alty in all cases). "Now more than ever, Americans support the death penalty by
striking majorities." Id. In a poll taken by Princeton Survey research associates, 79%
of the adults surveyed favored the death penalty for Timothy McVeigh. See id.; see
also David Wallechinsky, 'He Killed My Child, But I Don't Want Him To Die,'
PARADE MAGAZINE, Jan. 18, 998, at 4 (noting that recent surveys conclude that a
majority of Americans favor the death penalty).
17. See generally Editorial, Death and Delusion, 19 NAT'L L.J. 44, June 30, 1997, at
A14 (noting that "[plopular sentiment has long favored the death penalty"); Scott
Robinson, Editorial, Stacking the Deck Heart-Wrenching 'Victim Impact' Statements
Make it Virtually Impossible for Jurors to Set Emotion Aside, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
June 8, 1997, at 1B (noting that in "modern-day death penalty trials" the "emphasis
has shifted to the personal human consequences of crime, paving the way for death
sentences based on moral outrage and retribution"); Brent Staples, Editorial, When
Grieving 'Victims' Can Sway the Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1997, at A26 (stating
that "the Solemn activity of mourning has become a raucous and public blood sport").
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deeply touch the jury in a way that substantially prejudices the
defendant. 18
Victim impact evidence, as introduced by oral testimony and
statements that identify victims of the crime and the extent of their
suffering, presents a myriad of problems to the American court sys-
tem,19 especially with regard to the criminal defendant's right to a
fair trial. This Note traces the historical development of victim im-
pact statements ("VIS") through United States Supreme Court ju-
risprudence and state legislation, and analyzes their use in the
sentencing phase of capital trials. Part I explores the case and stat-
utory history of VIS during capital sentencing hearings. Part II ex-
amines the current use of VIS and the reality of their
consequences, by comparing the recent sentencings of Jesse Tim-
mendequas and Timothy McVeigh. Part III argues that the
Supreme Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee20 has troublesome
implications in light of the capital defendant's constitutional rights,
the history of the death penalty, and traditional sentencing proce-
dures. This Note concludes by proposing guidelines that should be
expressed in an amendment to the United States Constitution to
compel all courts to uniformly regulate the use of VIS during capi-
tal sentencing hearings and to protect the constitutional rights of
defendants.
18. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognizes how substantially emo-
tions can prejudice in holding that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EViD. 403. The
prejudice which Rule 403 refers to is "unfair prejudice." Ballou v. Henri Studios, 656
F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that unfair prejudice is "an undue tendency to sug-
gest a decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one"). See e.g., Terry v. State, 491 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (holding that
the autopsy pictures revealing severed parts of an infant's body "clearly served to
inflame the minds of the jury"); see also infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text
(detailing the pain and anguish jurors, reporters, and spectators endured as family
members of the victims of the Oklahoma bombing took the stand at Timothy Mc-
Veigh's sentencing hearing).
19. See United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1491 (D. Colo. 1996) (stating
that victim impact statements are the "most problematical of all the aggravating fac-
tors and may present the greatest difficulty in determining the nature and scope of the
'information' to be considered").
20. 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding that "the eighth amendment did not erect a per
se bar prohibiting a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact
evidence").
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
I. A Historical Perspective
A. Case Law
The constitutionality of victim impact evidence was first ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in Booth v. Maryland.21 The Court
held, in a five-to-four decision, that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits a capital sentencing jury from considering VIS.22 The VIS,
prepared by the State of Maryland, provided the jury with a de-
scription of the personal characteristics of the victims and the emo-
tional impact of the crime on the survivors.23 They also contained
family members' detailed characterizations and opinions of both
the crime and the defendant.24 The Court found that the admission
of VIS "creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury
may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.
'
"25
21. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). Booth was convicted of robbing and murdering an eld-
erly couple and a jury of his peers sentenced him to death, after considering a VIS.
See id. at 501-02.
22. See id. The Court reasoned that such information is entirely irrelevant to the
decision of imposing the death penalty. See id. at 503.
23. See id. at 499-500.
24. See id. The statement was formulated on the basis of interviews with the fami-
lies of both of the victims and described in great detail the emotional impact of the
crime, including personal problems that the survivors have since endured. See id. at
499. It also emphasized the victims' background and personalities, highlighting their
best qualities and stressing how much they would be missed. See id. In one section,
the daughter "concluded that she could not forgive the murderer, and that such a
person could '[n]ever be rehabilitated."' Id. at 500 (quoting App. 62). The son noted
that as a result of the crime he suffers from insomnia and depression, and is "fearful
for the first time in his life." Id. (quoting App. 61). Moreover, he asserted that his
parents were "butchered like animals." Id. "The VIS also noted that the grand-
daughter had received counseling for several months after the incident, but eventually
stopped because she concluded that 'no one could help her."' Id. (quoting App. 63).
The State Division of Parole and Prohibition official, who had conducted the inter-
views, concluded the VIS by writing: "It is doubtful they will ever be able to fully
recover from this tragedy and not be haunted by the memory of the brutal manner in
which their loved ones were murdered and taken from them." Id. (quoting App. 63-
64).
Defendant moved to suppress this emotionally laden VIS on the grounds that it was
"both irrelevant and unduly inflammatory, and that therefore its use in a capital case
violated the Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 500-501; see also
U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII (providing that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
25. Booth, 482 U.S. at 503. The Court in Booth was deeply concerned with preju-
dicial impact VIS can have on defendants, especially in light of their irrelevancy to the
blameworthiness of the defendant. See id. at 504. The Court reasoned that the de-
fendant most often does not know the victim and therefore can have no such knowl-
edge about his or her character and/or family. See id. (stating that studies have
revealed "defendants rarely select their victims based on whether the murder will
19981
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The Supreme Court subsequently held, in South Carolina v.
Gathers,26 that VIS given by a prosecutor also violate the Eighth
Amendment. 7 Relying on Booth, the Court held that the state-
have an effect on anyone other than the person murdered"). In addition, the Court
noted that "a defendant's level of culpability depends not on fortuitous circumstances
such as the composition of his victim's family, but on circumstances over which he has
no control." Id. at 505 n.7 (quoting People v. Levitt, 156 Cal.App.3d 500, 516-17
(1984)). As such, "[a]llowing the jury to rely on a VIS therefore could result in im-
posing the death sentence because of factors about which the defendant was unaware,
and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill." Id. at 505. Such evidence could
indeed be prejudicial in diverting the jury's attention away from the defendant's back-
ground, record, and circumstances of the crime, and placing it instead on the victim's
family and their suffering. See id. And, while "'[sluch bereavement is relevant to
damages in a civil action,... it has no relationship to the proper purposes of sentenc-
ing in a criminal case.'" Id. at 505 n.7 (quoting Levitt, 156 Cal.App.3d at 516-17).
The Court further noted that VIS could also be prejudicial in that not every victim
leaves behind a family, and not all families can articulate their feelings of grief
equally. See id. (noting that "[t]he fact that the imposition of the death sentence may
turn on such distinctions illustrates the danger of allowing juries to consider this infor-
mation"). The ability of a family to express its grief is a factor which must remain
irrelevant to determining something as grave as who should live or die. See id. Con-
sequently, some victims may be viewed as more valuable in the eyes of society than
others, and some defendants more deserving of punishment. See id. at 506. Our sys-
tem does not tolerate distinctions to be made which would render some defendants,
whose victims were assets to their community, more deserving of punishment, as op-
posed to those whose victims were not. See id. at 506 n.8.
A final threshold concern of the Court was the difficulty, if not impossibility, of a
fair rebuttal to VIS; for any cross-examination would surely have the effect of "shift-
ing the focus of the sentencing hearing away from the defendant" and consequently
create a "'mini-trial' on the victim's character." Id. at 506-507. Granting the state
permission to introduce evidence of the personal qualities of the victim would, in turn,
open the door to defendant to rebut such information. See id. (citing Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (due process requires that
defendant be given a chance to rebut presentence report)). Such a result "is more
than simply unappealing; it could well distract the sentencing jury from its constitu-
tionally required task - determining whether the death penalty is appropriate in light
of the background and record of the accused and the particular circumstances of the
crime." Id. at 507 (emphasis added & italic omitted). Moreover, the admission of the
family members' opinions and characterizations of the crime were held to "serve no
other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on relevant
evidence concerning the crime and the defendant." Id. at 508.
Accordingly, the Court ruled that a decision to impose the death penalty that might
turn on the aforementioned factors could never be justified. As such, the introduction
of a VIS at a capital sentencing hearing was held to violate the Eighth Amendment.
See id. at 509.
26. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
27. See id. Defendant Demetrius Gathers was convicted of the murder of a self-
proclaimed minister and was sentenced to death. See id. at 806. The victim, Richard
Haynes, was about 31 years old and unemployed. See id. at 807. Evidence revealed
that Haynes had suffered some mental disturbances over the course of the two years
prior to his death and had consequently been in and out of a mental hospital three
times. See id. Despite his lack of formal religious training, he rendered himself a
preacher, referring to himself as "Reverend Minister." Moreover, he typically carried
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ments at issue concerned "personal characteristics of the victim"
which were irrelevant to the defendant's blameworthiness. 28 As
such, the Court deemed it unconstitutional to impose a sentence of
death based upon factors of which the defendant could not have
been aware.29
Only two years later, however, the Court, in Payne v. Tennesse,
overruled Booth and Gathers, in so far as they prohibited VIS.3°
The Payne Court's six-to-three decision opened the door to victim
impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the vic-
tim, the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family, as
several bags containing such religious articles as rosary beads, two Bibles, olive oil,
plastic statues, and religious tracts. See id.
The prosecutor's closing remarks before the sentencing jury included reading at
length from a religious tract that the victim had been carrying at the time of the mur-
der and commenting on personal qualities inferred from the possession of such. See
id. at 808. The tract from which the prosecutor read was entitled "The Game Guy's
Prayer." It relied upon metaphors of football and boxing to extol the virtues of the
"good sport." See id. at 807. The prosecutor inferred from the fact that the victim
possessed this tract, as well as a voter registration card, that he was a religious man
who cared about his community. See id. at 809. The prosecutor remarked:
We know from the proof that Reverend Minister Haynes was a religious
person. He had his religious items out there .... Among the many cards
that Reverend Haynes had among his belongings was this card. It's in evi-
dence. Think about it when you go back there. He had ... religious items,
his beads. He had a plastic angel.
Id. at 808 (citing App. 41-43). In addition, the prosecutor read one of the victim's
prayers at length, and concluded: "Reverend Haynes believed in this community. He
took part. And he believed that in Charleston County, in the United States of
America, that in this country you could go to a public park and sit on a public bench
and not be attacked by the likes of Demetrius Gathers." Id.
28. Id. at 811 (noting that the statement by the prosecutor is "indistinguishable in
any relevant respect from that in Booth"). "As in Booth, '[a]llowing the jury to rely
on [this information] ... could result in imposing the death sentence because of fac-
tors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision
to kill."' Id. (citing Booth, 482 U.S. at 505).
29. The Court relied on their prior holding in Booth, in which the Court held that
"such statements introduced factors that might be 'wholly unrelated to the blamewor-
thiness of a particular defendant."' Id. (citing Booth, 482 U.S. at 504). In conclusion,
the Gathers Court rendered the content of the victim's belongings, such as the reli-
gious tract from which the prosecutor read and his voter registration card, to have
been completely irrelevant to the circumstances of the crime. Id. at 812 (stating that
"[u]nder these circumstances, the content of the various papers the victim happened
to be carrying when he was attacked was purely fortuitous and cannot provide any
information relevant to the defendant's moral culpability"). The logic of this reason-
ing seems obvious when considering the flip side of the facts of the Gathers case. For
instance, the victim's bag could very well have contained porno magazines and a dime
bag of marijuana instead of religious artifacts.
30. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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well as comments from the prosecutor.3' The Court reasoned that
the Booth decision "unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial"
because the defendant has a right to introduce all mitigating evi-
dence that may inform the jury about his character, while the State
is barred from counteracting such evidence. Moreover, the Court
31. See id. (holding that "[t]he Eight Amendment erects no per se bar prohibiting
a capital sentencing jury from considering 'victim impact' evidence relating to the
victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on the vic-
tim's family, or precluding a prosecutor from arguing such evidence at a capital sen-
tencing hearing"). Payne was convicted of first-degree murder of a mother and her
two-year-old daughter, and first-degree assault with intent to murder a three-year-old
boy. See id. at 811. The jury sentenced Payne to death and Payne appealed, contend-
ing that the admission of testimony by the victim's grandmother, as well as the State's
closing argument, violated his Eighth Amendment rights under Booth. See id. at 816.
The grandmother's testimony described how her grandson Nicholas had been af-
fected by the murders of both his mother and sister. See id. at 814. She asserted:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come
home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during
the week and asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him
yes. He says, I'm worried about my Lacie.
Id. at 814-15 (citing App. 3).
During closing arguments, in an effort to persuade the jury to apply the death pen-
alty, the prosecutor commented:
There is obviously nothing you can do for Charisse and Lacie Jo. But there
is something you can do for Nicholas. Somewhere down the road Nicholas is
going to grow up, hopefully. He's going to want to know what happened to
his baby sister and his mother. He's going to want to know what type of
justice was done. He is going to want to know what happened. With your
verdict, you will provide the answer.
Id. at 815 (citing App. 12).
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed both the sentence and the convic-
tion, rejecting the merit of Payne's assertions. See id. at 827 ("A state may legiti-
mately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder
on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death
penalty should be imposed."). The Court grounded its reasoning on the assertion that
"the assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result of the crime charged has
understandably been an important concern of the criminal law, both in determining
the elements of the offense and in determining the appropriate punishment. Id. at 819
(reasoning that "two equally blameworthy criminal defendants may be guilty of differ-
ent offenses solely because their acts cause differing amounts of harm"). The Court
illustrated that two defendants may each participate in a robbery, and each may act
with "reckless disregard for human life," but only one defendant may be subject to
the death penalty simply because his robbery resulted in the death of a victim, while
the other's did not. Id. (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148 (1987)).
32. See id. at 822. The Court reasoned:
while virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a
capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances, the State
is barred from either offering 'a quick glimpse of the life' which a defendant
'chose to extinguish,' or demonstrating the loss to the victim's family and to
society which has resulted from the defendant's homicide.
Id. (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting));
see also Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the State has a
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argued that VIS are not offered to provoke prejudicial and arbi-
trary determinations, but rather to show each victim's "uniqueness
as a human being. ' 33 Accordingly, the Payne Court concluded that
the specific harm caused by the defendant is essential to the jury's
meaningful assessment of the defendant's "moral culpability and
blameworthiness. "34
B. Victims' Rights Movement and the Legislative Response
Over the past three decades, a massive outpouring of support for
victims' rights has proliferated.35 Motivated by the same concerns
legitimate interest in counteracting the defendant's mitigating evidence "by reminding
the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too
the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in
particular to his family").
The Court deemed it an insult to all civilized members of society to welcome a
parade of witnesses who will testify on the defendant's behalf (i.e., with respect to
character, good deeds, troublesome background, upbringing, etc.), without granting
the victim an equal right of response. The Court found that to virtually place no limits
on the introduction of mitigating evidence by the defendant, but to bar the State
"from either offering 'a quick glimpse of the life' which a defendant 'chose to extin-
guish,' . . . or demonstrating the loss to the victim's family and to society which has
resulted from the defendant's homicide," is to unfairly weight the scales in a capital
trial. Id. at 822 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)). Thus, in a sincere effort to address such inequity and "keep the balance
true," the Court granted the victim a role in the prosecution. Id. at 826 (citing Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)). And, by rendering the heinousness of the
crime to be an inherent part of the defendant's blameworthiness, the Court removed
victims from the second-rate position they have for so long assumed, thereby tipping
the scales of justice back in the other direction.
33. Id. at 823 (dismissing the Booth Court's concern that VIS will encourage com-
parative judgments such as, "that defendants whose victims were assets to their com-
munity are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are perceived to
be less worthy").
34. Id. at 825. However, in rendering VIS valid under the Eighth Amendment,
the Court did not mean to say that they were not troublesome. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence noted: "We do not hold today that victim impact evidence must be ad-
mitted, or even that it should be admitted. We hold merely that if a State decides to
permit consideration of this evidence, 'the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.'"
Id. at 831. "If, in a particular case, a witness' testimony or a prosecutor's remark so
infects the sentencing proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant
may seek appropriate relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id.
35. See Carrie L. Mulholland, Note, Sentencing Criminals: The Constitutionality of
Victim Impact Statements, 60 Mo. L. REV. 731, 734 (1995) ("The rise of the victims'
rights movement started in the 1960's, in conjunction with the women's rights move-
ment's.claim that the criminal system mistreated rape victims").
Recent years have seen an outpouring of popular concern for what has be-
come known as 'victims' rights' - a phrase that describes what its propo-
nents feel is the failure of the courts of justice to take into account in their
sentencing decisions not only the factors mitigating the defendant's moral
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as the Payne Court, advocates of the victims' rights movement seek
to balance the rights of victims with those already granted to the
defendant by entitling them to a voice and a means of fair re-
dress. 36 They argue that the system ignores victims, thereby vic-
timizing them twice. 7 In an attempt to level the playing field, the
guilt, but also the amount of harm he has caused to innocent members of
society.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Kathryn E. Bartolo, Payne v.
Tennessee: The Future Role of Victim Statements of Opinion in Capital Sentencing Pro-
ceedings, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1217, 1218 (1992) (noting that "by 1991, there were over
7,000 victim assistance programs"); Carole Mansur, Comment, Payne v. Tennessee:
The Effect of Victim Harm at Capital Sentencing Trials and the Resurgence of Victim
Impact Statements, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 713, 715 (noting that the growing concern
for victims' rights "coincides with a period of rising crime and violence in our soci-
ety"); Michael Ita Oberlander, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact Statements as
Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1621, 1623 (1992) ("The victims' rights
movement is a viable and active political force in American society today"). The
1960's witnessed a primary concern for "establishing compensation programs at the
state level and on expanding restitution as a sentencing alternative," while the 70's
made victim-witness assistance programs a central concern of the lobbyists. See id. at
1625-26 (noting that "[tfhe victim-witness assistance programs serve the purpose of
guiding the victim through the complicated maze of the criminal justice system and
minimizing the administrative inconveniences associated with participation in the pro-
gress"). More recently, advocates have exacted a system that responds more directly
to the needs of the victims (i.e., "one that assists rather than manages the victim"). Id.
at 1626. Victims are currently demanding the right to personally participate in the
criminal process, deeming victim services that fail to provide such an opportunity
meaningless. See id. Consequently, such activism has propagated many recent re-
sponses on behalf of the government. See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
Cf. Jose Felipe Anderson, Will The Punishment Fit The Victims? The Case For Pre-
Trial Disclosure, and The Uncharted Future of Victim Impact Information in Capital
Jury Sentencing, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 367, 396 (1997) (noting that "[t]he movement has
not only resulted in increased victim participation in criminal cases by encouraging
states to adopt victim impact statements at sentencing, it has also spawned many re-
cent successful state efforts to ratify victim based constitutional amendments").
"Even federal law provides for victim participation in the sentencing process." Id. at
396-97 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(4)).
36. See Mulholland, supra note 35, at 734 (1995) ("Supporters of the movement
contended that the criminal justice system was entirely unsympathetic to victims by
denying them a formal role in the judicial system, exploiting them to prosecute the
criminal, and failing to provide rehabilitation or assistance after sentencing of the
criminal."). Essentially, supporters mandate that the law provide victims with a more
meaningful role in the criminal justice system. See id.; see also Diane Kiesel, Crime
and Punishment: Victim Rights Movement Presses Courts, Legislatures, 70 A.B.A. J.
25, 28 (Jan. 1984).
37. See Oberlander, supra note 35. Some victims feel as though the system ex-
cludes them from participating in the prosecution of the defendant, thereby victimiz-
ing them yet again. See id.; see also Thomas J. Phalen & Jane L. McClellan, Speaking
For The Dead At Death Sentencing: Victim Statements in Capital Cases - A Right of
Survivorship?, 31 ARIZ. Arr'v 12, 12 (Nov. 1994) (noting that one goal of the move-
ment is "to prevent victims from being victimized twice - once by the criminal and
once by the criminal justice system"). Essentially, the argument is that victims are too
1998] VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS 611
movement places primary emphasis on passing legislation, with an
ultimate goal of achieving a constitutional amendment. 38 Two con-
cerns seem to govern the movement: (1) the desire for the victim to
obtain closure and regain a sense of control over life, and (2) the
concern for retributive justice.39
often forgotten by the system, and deemed irrelevant to the administration of justice.
By means of the VIS, however, the jury is forced to view the victim as flesh and blood
and take into account the true extent of the defendant's actions. Without such evi-
dence, both the crime and the victim are otherwise marginalized.
38. See Kelly McMurry, Victims' Rights Movement Rises to Power, Ass'N OF TRIAL
LAW. OF AM., July 1, 1997 (stating that the "ultimate goal" of victims' rights advocates
is "to win passage and enactment of a proposed victims' rights amendment to the U.S.
Constitution" and further noting that this effort has already achieved "the endorse-
ment of President Clinton and won significant bipartisan support in Congress"). Sup-
porters of the amendment are motivated primarily by the hope that its passage would
"bring into balance a criminal justice system in which the scales are tipped in favor of
the accused." Id. (noting that "[a]n amendment would also ensure that crime victims'
rights are enumerated in much the same way the Bill of Rights outlines protections
for criminal defendants"). In its current form, as Senate Joint Resolution 6, the pro-
posed 28th Amendment provides victims of violence the following rights:
to be notified of and to attend all public proceedings relating to the crime; to
be heard and to submit impact statements at sentencing and parole hearings;
to be notified of an offender's release, parole, or escape; to a final disposi-
tion of the criminal proceedings without unreasonable delay; to an order of
restitution from the convicted offender; to have the safety of the victim con-
sidered in determining any offender's release from custody; and to be noti-
fied of these rights.
Id. (noting that "[w]hile advocates are quick to applaud ... federal and state meas-
ures, they contend that the legislation varies in scope and, when taken together, does
not go far enough to ensure that 'justice, fairness, and equity are extended to all inno-
cent victims of crimes, just as we properly do for those accused of crimes'"). In es-
sence, the above proposal combines the assurances of a number of federal and state
legislative acts into a constitutional amendment in an effort to ensure universal appli-
cation. See also Evan Gahr, Advocates Raise Wide Support for Victims-Rights Amend-
ment, INSIGHT MAG., March 10, 1997, at 42 (noting that the leaders of the grassroots
crime-victims movement are pushing for amendment because "[a]bsent federal action
... the justice system will continue to treat victims as second-class citizens"). The
overall consensus of the advocates is that there is a pressing need to enumerate such
rights; for without an amendment there is no way to guarantee that the rights of crime
victims will not be ignored. See id. The rights provided by the proposal are indeed
pertinent in ensuring a victims a greater degree of rights within the justice system;
however, the proposal ignores the effects on the defendant. My own proposal, in
contrast, addresses the rights of both victims and defendants, in an effort to attain a
true balance. See supra notes 145-155 & accompanying text. Rather than included
only general provisions that essentially reiterate current statutory rights, my amend-
ment proposal focuses primarily on controlling the prejudice which VIS have the
grave potential to create. See id.
39. Oberlander, supra note 35, at 1624 (citing Maureen McLeod, Victim Participa-
tion at Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 501, 504 (1986)). "A victim is often devastated
by the criminal act against her because of her resulting feeling of vulnerability and her
sense that she has lost control over her life. Consequently, some critics have viewed
the victims' rights movement merely as a self therapy for victims." Id. at 1624-25; see
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In response to innumerable proposals by victims' rights advo-
cates and out of a growing concern for the rights of victims, Con-
gress took a ground-breaking step in 1982 and enacted the Victim
and Witness Protection Act,40 which sought -to accord witnesses
and victims a greater degree of rights and protections in the crimi-
nal justice system.41 In 1990, Congress passed the federal Victims
Rights and Restitution Act,42 more commonly known as the Vic-
tims' Bill of Rights,43 granting victims the right to be notified of,
and present at, court proceedings and to be kept apprised of the
status of such factors as the defendant's conviction, sentencing, im-
prisonment, and release.44 The Victims' Bill of Rights mandated
that victims could not be excluded from the courtroom, unless their
also Mulholland, supra note 35, at 747, 735 (noting that victims' families seek "a
means of coping and closure," as well as "more effectively equate the criminal's pun-
ishment to the full extent of the harm caused").
40. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 2(b)(1), 96
Stat. 1248 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § § 1512-1515, 3579-3850 (1988)). Public Law
Number 98-473, section 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984) amended § § 3579-80 and relo-
cated the sections to 18 U.S.C. § § 3663 and 3664.
41. See id.; see also Oberlander, supra note 35, 1626 n.28 (stating that the Act
"codified Congressional findings that recognized the importance of victims in the
criminal justice system"). The Victim and Witness Protection Act recognized the im-
portance of victims in the criminal justice system, declaring its purposes to be:
(1) to enhance and protect the necessary role of crime victims and witnesses
in the criminal justice process; (2) to ensure that the Federal Government
does all that is possible within limits of available resources to assist victims
and witnesses of crime without infringing on the constitutional rights of the
defendant; and (3) to provide a model for legislation for State and local
governments.
See Oberlander, supra note 35 at 1626 n.28 (citing 96 Stat. at 1249). In addition, the
Act "amended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require the inclusion of
victim impact as part of the presentence report submitted to the sentencing author-
ity." Mulholland, supra note 35, at 735.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b) (1995). A crime victim has the following rights:
(1) the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's
dignity and privacy; (2) the right to be reasonably protected from the ac-
cused offender; (3) the right to be notified of court proceedings; (4) the right
to be present at all public court proceedings related to the offense, unless the
court determines that testimony by the victim would be materially affected if
the victim heard other testimony at trial; (5) the right to confer with attorney
for the Government in the case; (6) the right to restitution; (7) the right to
information about the conviction, sentencing, imprisonment, and release of
the offender.
Id.
43. See McMurry, supra note 38.
44. See id. (citing Paul G. Cassel & Robert E. Hoyt, The Tale of Victims' Rights,
LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at 32); see also 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b).
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presence at trial would materially alter their testimony at the
sentencing.4 5
This conditional language of the Victims' Bill of Rights was
tested, however, during the Timothy McVeigh trial,46 when Judge
Matsch ruled that if the victims of the crime were to testify at the
sentencing, then they could not be present at the trial.47 Conse-
quently, most victims of the Oklahoma bombing faced a Catch-22.
If they opted to testify at sentencing, then they would never see
justice play out. If they watched the trial, however, then they could
never personally tell the jury of their suffering.48 Frustrated and
angered by having to make such a painful choice, the victims
turned to Congress in hopes of redress, arguing that the defendant
had no legitimate basis for barring them from trial.49
In response to their cries, President Clinton endorsed the "Vic-
tim Rights Clarification Act"5 ("VRCA") on March 19, 1997,
overruling Matsch's order on the eve of the trial and mandating
that a crime victim be permitted to make VIS, as well as observe
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4).
46. McVeigh was found guilty and sentenced to death for using an explosive-laden
truck to blow up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, conse-
quently killing 168 people and injuring hundreds more. See John Gibeaut, The Last
Word: Jury Is Still Out On Effects Of Victim Impact Testimony, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997,
at 42. Six months after McVeigh was sentenced to die, Terry Nichols was convicted of
conspiring with McVeigh and eight counts of involuntary manslaughter, but acquitted
of first degree murder and use of a truck bomb. See Jo Thomas, Death Penalty Ruled
Out As Nichols Jury Deadlocks in Oklahoma Bombing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1998,
at Al. Nichols, however, escaped the death penalty, on January 7, 1998, when the
deeply divided jury failed to reach a unanimous decision. See id. (stating that after
deliberating for 13 hours, over the course of two days, the Federal jury "could not
decide just how active a role he played in the bombing"). Judge Matsch dismissed the
jury and will now impose sentencing himself. See id. But, under Federal law, only a
jury may impose a sentence of death; thus, Nichols will now get a life term, or possibly
a lesser sentence. See id. (noting that Nichols still could face the death penalty should
a grand jury in Oklahoma indite him and McVeigh in state murder charges).
47. See United States v. McVeigh, 958 F. Supp. 512, 514 (D. Colo. 1997) (excluding
potential penalty witnesses from the courtroom under Rule 615 of the Federal Rules
of civil Procedure); see also McMurry, supra note 38 (stating that Judge Matsch's con-
cern was "[t]hat what they heard and saw in the courtroom could prejudice their
testimony").
48. See McMurry, supra note 38.
49. See id.; see also 143 CONG. REC. S2507-01, S2507 (March 19, 1997) (noting that
the Victim Rights and Restitution Act serves to clarify the Victims' Bill of Rights "so
it is indisputable that district courts cannot deny victims and surviving family mem-
bers the opportunity to watch the trial merely because they will provide information
during the sentencing phase of the proceedings"); Judge Gives Bomb Survivors OK to
Attend McVeigh Trial, S. F. EXAMINER, March 26, 1997, at All.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3510 (1997).
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the trial itself.51 The Act's goal is to treat victims with a greater
degree of respect by demanding that they be granted not only a
voice by which to express their pain, but also a wider latitude of
participation.5 2
II. The Reality of Victim Impact Statements in the Courtrooms
of Capital Sentencing Hearings Today
The VRCA and the Payne decision provide the groundwork for
the law today with respect to VIS, despite their failure to specify
any limitations or guidelines regarding the scope of admissible
statements.5 3 Thus, while forty-nine states presently allow the sen-
tencing jury to consider VIS in non-capital cases,54 the extent of
their use varies distinctly from court to court, and state to state.
Many jurisdictions mirror the Payne Court's decision, broadly al-
lowing statements from the families of victims about the impact of
51. See id. The statute, which is currently in effect, enacted a new provision that
allows victims of crime in capital cases to observe the trial "of a defendant accused of
that offense because such victim may, during the sentencing hearing, testify as to the
effect of the offense on the victim and the victim's family .... ." See McVeigh, 958 F.
Supp. at 514 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3510(b)). The title is short for Public Law 105-6,
which the President signed. See id.; see also 143 CONG. REC. at S2508 ("This bill will
ensure that victims of crimes have an opportunity to alleviate some of their suffering
through witnessing the operation of the criminal justice system."); Editorial,
Oklahoma Trial Ruling Fallout, CHI. SUN-TIMES, March 27, 1997, at 29.
52. See 143 CONG. REC. at S2507 (noting that "this is an important piece of bipar-
tisan legislation that will clarify the intent of Congress with respect to a victim's right
to attend and observe a trial and participate at sentencing"). One speaker, Mr.
Leahy, a senator from Vermont, further noted the importance of victims both having
access to the courtroom and being heard, recalling:
many times when the person being sentenced had suddenly gotten religion,
had suddenly become a model person, usually dressed in a better suit and tie
than I wore as a prosecutor and was able to cry copious tears seeking for-
giveness and saying how it was all a mistake, sometimes reality came to the
courtroom only when the victim would speak.
Id. at S2507-$2508. Mr. Leahy continued: "I remember one such victim had very little
to say, with heavy scars on her face that would probably never heal. That said more
than she might." Id. at S2508 (noting the statute's probable influence on state courts
as well).
53. See Gibeaut, supra note 46, at 43. "'There is simply no clear guidance [from
Payne] as to where the line between appropriate ... victim impact testimony ends and
an appeal to passion - the human reactions, emotive reactions of revenge, rage [and]
empathy, all of those things - beings,' Matsch told the lawyers before the sentencing
phase began." Id.
54. See Mulholland, supra note 35, at 742.
55. See id. at 743; see also Oberlander, supra note 35, at 1627 (noting that "[w]hile
almost all states allow for some form of victim impact at some stage in the judicial
process, the extent of that involvement varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction").
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the death on the family.56 Other states, however, have imposed
more stringent limitations on their use.57 For example, some states,
56. See Mulholland, supra note 35, at 743 & n.74. The following state statutes spe-
cifically provide for victim impact evidence from the victim's family in some form or
another: ALASKA CODE § 12.55.022 (1997); ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp.
1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § § 5-65-102, 5-65-109 (Michie Supp. 1997); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1191.1 (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 24-4.1-302, 24-4.1-
302.5 (Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-220 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4331 (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-103 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.143 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-5306(1)(b)(3) (Supp. 1994); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/6 (West Supp. 1997);
IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 901.3 (West Supp. 1994);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1019 (Supp. 1994); Ky. REV. STAT. § § 421.500, 421.520 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 875(B) (West Supp.
1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 6101, tit. 17A § 1257 (West Supp. 1994); MD.
ANN. CODE of 1957 art.41, § 4-609 (1993); MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 258B, § 3(p) (West
Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § § 780.752, 780.791 (West Supp. 1994); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § § 611A.01, 611A.037 (West Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-151,
et seq. (Supp. 1994) (bound); Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.762 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-18-112 (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2521 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651:4-a (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-6 (West Supp. 1995); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § § 31-26-3, 31-26-4 (Michie Supp. 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 390.30(3)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-825 (Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ § 12.1-34-01, 12.1-34-02(14) (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § § 2947.051, 2929.12
(Anderson Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § § 982, 984 (West Supp. 1996);
OR. REV. STAT. § § 137.530(3), 144.790(3) (1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, P.S. 180-9.3
(Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-3 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1150 (Law
Co-op. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23 A-28C-1 (Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE
ANN. § § 40-35-207, 40-38-203 (1994); TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. § 56.03 (West
Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § § 19.2-
264.5, 19.2-299.1 (Michie 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7006 (Supp. 1993); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § § 7.69.020, 7.69.030 (West Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE § § 61-11A-
2, 61-11A-3 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 950.04 (West 1994); Wyo. STAT. § § 7-21-101,
7-13-303 (1994). But see id. at n.77 (noting that Hawaii does not have any statute or
case law addressing the constitutionality of VIS); see also ALA. R. CRIM. P. 26.3
(1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.145 (Supp. 1993). "The Alabama and Nevada victim
impact statutes do not provide for victim impact statutes taken from the victim's fam-
ily;" however, they do allow statements from the victim. Mulholland, supra note 35,
at 743 & n.77.
57. See Mulholland, supra note 35, at 743. For example, some states impose vari-
ous requirements such as:
(1) the statements must be general and cannot delve into the victim's charac-
ter and worth; (2) the statements must be read by the prosecutor, and not on
the form of testimony from family members; (3) the statements cannot be
unduly prejudicial to the defendant; (4) the statements must adhere to victim
impact statement forms; and (5) the statements can only be used when a
judge, instead of a jury, is sentencing the defendant.
Id. Cf. TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. § 56.03 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring VIS to
comply with victim impact forms);.State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 516 (Mo. 1994) (re-
quiring that statements be general and not delve into the victim's character); State v.
Sumpter, 438 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 1989) (requiring victim impact evidence to comply
with victim impact forms).
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such as Idaho and Georgia, limit VIS to non-capital cases,58 while
Pennsylvania, Kansas, and New Hampshire allow VIS only when a
judge, and not a jury, is sentencing the defendant. 9 Currently,
twelve of the thirty-eight states that impose the death penalty have
permitted consideration of victim impact statements during capital
sentencing hearings.60
A. New Jersey's Approach
New Jersey is one of the states that has permitted VIS in capital
cases after Payne, but has been particularly stern with respect to
their use. On June 19, 1995, Governor Whitman signed a "victim
impact statute '61 into law, which essentially provides that the pros-
ecution may admit evidence of the victim's character and the im-
pact of the death on the victim's survivors, but not until the
defendant has placed his own character at issue.62 Moreover, the
58. See, e.g., Sermons v. State, 417 S.E.2d 144 (Ga. 1992) (following Muckle v.
State, 211 S.E.2d 361 (Ga. 1974)); State v. Wersland, 873 P.2d 144, 146 (Idaho 1994)
(holding VIS statements from the victim's parents to be admissible in a non-capital
case); State v. Bivens, 803 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) (noting that in the
absence of the death penalty, the court may consider VIS during sentencing)..
59. See Mulholland, supra note 35, at 743 n.76; see also, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651:4-a (Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, P.S. § 180-9.3 (Supp. 1994); State
v. Hill, 799 P.2d 997, 999 (Kan. 1990).
60. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-11-103 (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1997); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (West Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030
(West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-302 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West
1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10(c) (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.150 (Supp. 1996); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West Supp. 1997-98); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23 A-27A-2(2) (Michie Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207
(Supp. 1996); see also Gibeaut, supra note 46.
61. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(6) (1995).
62. See id. "Unlike the open-ended federal law and many state statutes, New
Jersey's only allows victim impact evidence if the defendant first presents evidence on
his or her own character." Gibeaut, supra note 46, at 43. The law provides that:
When a defendant at a sentencing proceeding presents evidence of the de-
fendant's character or record pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5)
of this subsection, the State may present evidence of the murder victim's
character and background and of the impact of the murder on the victim's
survivors. If the jury finds that the State has proven at least one aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury finds the existence of a miti-
gating factor pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsec-
tion, the jury may consider the victim and survivor evidence presented by
the State pursuant to this paragraph in determining the proper weight to
give mitigating evidence presented pursuant to subparagraph (h) of para-
graph (5) of this subsection.
State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 169 (N.J. 1996) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(6)).
The statute was enacted by the New Jersey Legislature in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Payne, as well as the constitutional authority granted by the New
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Supreme Court of New Jersey has noted that despite the statute's
constitutional authority under Payne, it "'provides an additional
and, where appropriate, more expansive source of protections
against the arbitrary ... imposition of the death penalty.' "
63
New Jersey allows the use of VIS only in limited circumstances,
and in a way that the jury will not likely become "overwhelmed
and confused. ' 64 The Supreme Court of New Jersey refuses to ad-
mit statements by the family members that either make characteri-
zations or elicit personal opinions about the defendant, the crime,
or the appropriate sentence. 65 Any statement that is "grossly in-
flammatory, unduly prejudicial, or extremely likely to divert the
jury from its focus on the aggravating and mitigating factors" like-
wise is excluded. 66 Accordingly, the New Jersey courts have lim-
ited victim impact evidence to "statements designed to show the
Jersey Victim Right's Amendment, which "explicitly authorized the Legislature to
provide victims with 'those rights and remedies' that are deemed appropriate to effec-
tuate the purposes of that Amendment." Id. at 170. The Victim's Rights Amendment
provides:
A victim of a crime shall be treated with the fairness, compassion and re-
spect by the criminal justice system. A victim of a crime shall not be denied
the right to be present at public judicial proceedings except when, prior to
completing testimony as a witness, the victim is properly sequestered in ac-
cordance with the laws of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of
New Jersey. A victim of a crime shall be Entitled to those rights provided by
the Legislature....
Id. at 169.
63. Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 173 (quoting State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939 (1988),
quoting State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (1987)).
64. Id. at 175. The Muhammad Court held that a brief statement by the victim's
family, as to how the murder impacted their lives, would not tend to inflame the jury
anymore than would a brief statement by the defendant. See id. at 175 (citing State v.
Zola, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989) (holding that a brief
statement by-the defendant "would not inject fatal emotionalism into the jury's delib-
erations")). However, the Muhammad Court noted limitations on the use of such
evidence, holding that if offered to rebut the defendant's presentation of mitigating
evidence, the VIS must be both "relevant and reliable." Id. at 176. Moreover, the
admission of such evidence demands a balancing test as whether its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a risk of prejudice to the defendant or confusion to the
jury. Id. The Court noted that "in each case there is a traditional guard against the
inflammatory risk, in the trial judge's authority and responsibility to control the pro-
ceedings consistently with due process, on which grounds the defendant may object."
Id. (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 836 (Souter, J., concurring)). In addition, the evalua-
tion of specific victim impact evidence's admission should ultimately be left to the
discretion of the trial court, unless such evidence is on its face clearly inadmissible.
See id. at 176.
65. See id.
66. Id. (citing State v. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172 (N.J. 1988)). "Allowing such testi-
mony could render a defendant's trial fundamentally unfair and could lead to the
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty." Id. at 176-77.
19981
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
impact of the crime on the victim's family and to statements that
demonstrate that the victim was not a faceless stranger," conclud-
ing that "[t]here is no place in a capital trial for unduly inflam-
matory commentary. "67
The New Jersey Legislature also has taken steps to reduce the
chance that the jury will misuse victim impact evidence. 68 For in-
stance, the jury may consider victim impact evidence only if the
jury finds that the State has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, at
least one aggravating factor, and the jury finds the existence of a
mitigating factor.69 Moreover, even if such requirements are met,
the VIS can be used only to determine how much weight the jury
will attach to the catch-all mitigating factor.7 ° In contrast to other
state legislatures, the New Jersey Legislature adamantly opposes
the use of victim impact evidence as a general aggravating factor,
in a sincere effort to shield the sentencing phase from prejudice.71
As such, the Legislature has adopted a number of safeguards to
ensure that such evidence "will not be admitted in a manner that
would allow the arbitrary and unconstitutional imposition of the
death penalty. 7 T2
67. Id. at 177. The Muhammad Court concluded that "in conjunction with the
Victim's Rights Amendment, it is obvious that the electorate of New Jersey wants the
State to align itself with the weight of authority that has recognized the relevance of
victim impact evidence." Id. at 178.
68. See id. at 179 (noting that "the admission of victim impact evidence is limited
to a clearly delineated course").
69. See id.
70. See id. "Essentially, section 5(h) is a catch-all factor of defendant's mitigating
evidence not encompassed in the other defining factors." Id. at 170. The victim im-
pact statute mandates that such evidence can be introduced for one purpose and one
purpose only - to give the jury proper assistance in determining the appropriate
weight to give the catch-all mitigating factor. Id. at 179. "Victim impact testimony
may not be used as a general aggravating factor or as a means of weighing the worth
of the victim." Id. "[O]ur law does not regard a crime committed against a particu-
larly virtuous person as more heinous than one committed against a victim whose
moral qualities are perhaps less noteworthy or apparent." Id. (quoting Williams, 550
A.2d at 1202).
71. See id. ai 179. Some state legislatures have enacted statutes that essentially
allow victim impact evidence to be admitted for any purpose whatsoever, as opposed
to New Jersey's more stringent limitations. See id, (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-
602(4) (Michie 1993)); see also ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38, para. 1406 (1989). Moreover,
it is apparent that the New Jersey Legislature relied upon previous state opinions
which recognized the necessity of allowing capital sentencing juries to "reach a verdict
and impose a penalty without inordinate exposure to unduly prejudicial, inflam-
matory commentary." Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 179 (citing Williams, 550 A.2d at
1204).
72. Id. The New Jersey victim impact statute does not automatically grant the
victim's family the right to testify during the sentencing hearing. See id. "'[R]ather,
the prosecutor is to determine what evidence, if any, should be submitted' to the
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B. Recent Capital Sentencing Hearings
All of the precautions constructed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court 73 were taken into account in the sentencing of Jesse Tim-
mendequas, the repeat sex offender who was convicted of the rape
and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka in 1994.74 In response
jury." Id. (citing Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 1728, at 1
(March 20, 1995)).
The limitations that we have placed on the admission of victim impact evi-
dence are not designed to restrict any of the rights afforded to victims by
either the Victim's Rights Amendment or the victim impact statute. Rather,
these controls are necessary to minimize the possibility that victim impact
statements made during the penalty phase of a capital trial will inflame the
jury and prevent it from deciding the proper punishment on the basis of
relevant evidence.
Id. at 180. For instance, prior to commencement of the sentencing hearing the de-
fendant must be warned that if he or she chooses to assert the catch-all factor, then
the State has the freedom to introduce victim impact evidence. See id. Moreover, the
State must provide the defendant with a list of names of all witnesses that it plans to
call so that defense counsel will have a full and fair opportunity to interview such
witnesses prior to their testimony. See id.
Recognizing the significant possibility that such evidence will prejudice the defend-
ant, the State has also expressed that, absent any exceptional circumstances, one sur-
vivor's account will suffice to provide the jury with "a glimpse of each victim's
uniqueness as a human being and to help the jurors make an informed assessment of
the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness." Id. (noting that "[t]he
greater the number of survivors who are permitted to present victim impact evidence,
the greater the potential for victim impact evidence to unduly prejudice the jury
against the defendant"). Emotions are to be kept under complete control, and the
court will not hear any testimony concerning "the victim's family member's character-
izations and opinions about the defendant, the crime, or the appropriate sentence."
Id. The State has further held that the testimony of minors should be permitted "ex-
cept under circumstances where there are no suitable adult survivors." Id.
In addition, the New Jersey judge ordinarily conducts a Rule 104 hearing before the
sentencing hearing begins as to the statement's admissibility. See id. The testimony
must be reduced to writing and can provide a general factual profile of the victim's
character, as well as describe the impact of the death on the family. See id. The
statement must be free of any "inflammatory comments or references" and must be
factual, not emotional. Id. Moreover, the probative value of the proffered testimony
cannot be substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice to the defendant. See id.
("Determining the relevance of the proffered testimony is particularly important be-
cause of the potential for prejudice and improper influence that is inherent in the
presentation of victim impact evidence."). However, the court notes that in making
the determination of relevance, there is ordinarily a strong presumption that the vic-
tim impact evidence will be admissible if it demonstrates that the victim was a unique
human being. See id. Finally, the prosecutor is put on notice that any comments
about victim impact evidence during closing arguments must be limited to that al-
ready stated by the witness, in his or her pre-approved testimony. See id.
73. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
74. See Dale Russakoff & Blaine Harden, Megan's Murderer is Sentenced To
Death; Jury Finds Repeat Sex Offender's Childhood Suffering Did Not Lessen Respon-
sibility, WASH. POST, June 21, 1997, at A3, available in 1997 WL 11162193. Jesse Tim-
mendequas, the repeat sex offender, was convicted of the rape and murder of 7-year-
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to defense counsel's pleas for compassion, Megan's father, Richard
Kanka, took the stand for the prosecution. 75 He read from a pre-
approved, three-page victim impact statement,76 portraying his
daughter as a tomboy who enjoyed playing with toy trucks in the
mud, and also as a girl, who adored having tea parties with her
dolls.77 Mr. Kanka also mentioned that Megan's brother, who was
eighteen months older, always considered himself her protector,
and has been found screaming in his closet in the middle of the
night in the three years since his sister's rape.78
As required by law, Mr. Kanka maintained his composure
throughout, and kept his "emotion at bay."' 79 While his statement
gave the jury a glimpse into the character of Megan Kanka and the
pain which her death has caused to those who loved her, it neither
capitalized upon such emotions, nor made inflammatory or preju-
dicial comments. By adhering to the procedural safeguards man-
dated by the New Jersey Supreme Court, Mr. Kanka's statement
balanced the sentencing hearing in the most controlled manner
possible.
In the recent trial of Timothy McVeigh,8" however, the VIS were
not as strictly regulated, and the emphasis shifted dramatically
from a small peek into the life of the victim to wrenching tales of
the horrifically personal and emotional consequences of McVeigh's
crime. The VIS permitted by the trial judge during the sentencing
hearing were drenched with pain, torment, despair, and anguish.8
old Megan Kanka and was sentenced to death by a jury in Trenton, New Jersey, on
July 21, 1997. See id. During the penalty phase, Timmendequas' lawyers pled for
mercy, insisting that his intent was never to kill Megan. See id. They characterized
him as borderline mentally retarded, perhaps due to his mother's alcoholism, a
pedophile, and a victim of sexual abuse by his own father. See id.
75. See Gibeaut, supra note 46, at 43.
76. See id.
77. See Russakoff & Harden, supra note 74. He noted that her favorite color was
pink and her favorite flavor of ice cream was mint chocolate chip. See id. "Megan
was our little community newsletter," he said, "with live broadcasts nearly every day
at dinner time." Id. Mr. Kanka also stated: "The only peace we have as parents are
the moments during sleep when we don't have to deal with the harsh realities of our
everyday lives." Gibeaut supra, note 46, at 43.
78. See Fate of Megan's Killer Argued; Death Penalty Begins In Case That Led To
Molester Notification Laws, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, June 19, 1997, at 6, available
in 1997 WL 4808789.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 46.
81. See Peter Gorner, Empathy vs. Impartiality In The Courtroom; Victims Leave
Lasting Impact On The System, CI. TRIB., June 15, 1997, at 1, available in WL
3558785 (noting that "[w]ithin minutes, six of the jurors had begun to weep").
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They consumed two full days of testimony, as a parade of witnesses
described in extensive detail the crime's gruesome aftermath.82
One police officer gave an account of "life ebbing from the hand
of a dying woman trapped by concrete rubble, whose gurgling
blood was mistaken for running water."83 Another heart-wrench-
ing story described to the jury three-year-old Brendan Denny
clenching a green block in his hand, with a brick embedded in his
forehead.' And, Kathleen Treanor told the jury how she kissed
her four-year-old daughter Ashley goodbye, never to see her alive
again. The parade of grief-stricken witnesses actually evoked
82. See Gibeaut, supra note 46, at 42. "[J]urors, spectators and even the judge
wept as family members, rescue workers and others took the stand for two days." Id.
at 43. U.S. District Judge Matsch's goal was to keep the sentencing hearing from
turning into some kind of public "lynching;" however, his efforts were apparently not
enough. See Richard A. Serrano, Judge Restricts McVeigh Penalty Case Testimony,
L.A. TIMEs, June 4, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 2216846 (noting that the pen-
alty phase "cannot become a matter of such emotional testimony which would in-
flame or incite the passions of the jury ... as to whether the defendant should be put
to death"). Matsch told piosecutors that he would allow relatives and survivors to
take the stand, but their testimony could not address a desire for revenge nor mention
the funerals of loved ones who has died as a result of the bombing. See id. Matsch
further barred from evidence any pictures of the victims or their family members at
weddings, Christmas celebrations, or other joyous occasions. See id. Matsch also de-
nied the government's request to admit certain videotapes of victims, including a
home-made film of a typical day at a credit union prior to the bombing. See id.; see
also Michael Fleeman, Judge in Oklahoma Bombing Vows to Avoid 'Lynching,' Pares
Back Hearing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4869060 (not-
ing that Judge Matsch also barred a poem by a victim's father). Despite such efforts,
however, grief, sorrow, and devastation took a toll on jurors and spectators alike. See
generally Gibeaut, supra note 46.
83. See Robinson, supra note 17. The use of VIS by witnesses such as police of-
ficers and coroners is obviously problematic given that bystanders are by definition
not victims. Thus, to introduce such testimony serves only to capitalize upon the ju-
rors' emotions, thereby running the impermissible risk that the death penalty will be
imposed arbitrarily and capriciously. See also infra text accompanying notes 126-128.
84. See Robinson, supra note 17 (questioning how any juror could respond dispas-
sionately to such an event).
85. Eric Pooley et al., Death or Life? McVeigh Could Be The Best Argument For
Executions, But His Case Highlights The Problems That Arise When Death Sentences
Are Churned Out In Huge Numbers, TIME MAO., June 16, 1997, at 31, available in
1997 WL 10902240. Treanor explained how after unspeakable days of waiting, she
"recovered her daughter's body from the rubble, buried the little girl, and trudged
on." Id. She said she received a call from the medical examiner's office several
months later. See id.
He said, 'We have recovered a portion of Ashley's Hand,' Treanor testified
in a trembling voice that Rose as she fought to get through each sentence,
'and we wanted to know if you wanted that buried in the mass grave or if
you would like to have it.' And I said, 'Of course, I want it. It's a part of
her.'
Id. That was about the extent of Treanor's testimony; for that was about all she could
physically and emotionally handle. See id. "Treanor dissolved, her body racked by
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such a "mass outpouring of empathy from those in attendance that
at least one newspaper offered to provide counseling for its report-
ers covering the case."'8 6 In fact, the government ultimately cut its
presentation short because of its dramatic effect. 7
Both McVeigh and Timmendequas were forced to pay for their
heinous crimes with their own lives. Their sentencing hearings dif-
fered drastically, however, with respect to the use of VIS. 8 A
comparison of the two hearings reveals the inconsistency that
plagues capital sentencing proceedings in America. What is per-
haps most troubling, however, is the grave potential for abuse in
situations where the evidence against the defendant is not so over-
whelming. In a case where the crime is not as atrocious, and the
guilt not as obvious, the emotional impact of the VIS certainly
could be the defining line between life and death.
sobs, and almost everyone in the courtroom dissolved with her. Jurors went openly,
survivors wailed, reporters groped for hankies and sodden bits of tissue." Id.
("Through it all sat McVeigh, cold and silent as stone."). It was at this very moment
that "it seemed unconceivable that the jury could do anything but sentence him to
death - and that anything but simple vengeance would be the reason why." Id.
"When the day's testimony was over, even [Judge Richard] Matsch looked shaken.
'You're human, and I'm human too,' he told the jury. '[But] we are not here to seek
revenge against Timothy McVeigh."' Id. But, his words appeared to have gone in
vain; for no type of limiting instruction could make those jurors forget the wrenching
testimony they had heard.
Other witnesses to take the stand included a ten-year-old boy, who told jurors
about the loss of his mother, a woman who had volunteered to work a hotline to
counsel victims, and a citizen who was moved to buy savings bonds for family mem-
bers of the deceased. See Serrano, supra note 82. A rescue worker also testified to
holding a hand in the burning rubble "only to feel the pulse stop." Fleeman, supra
note 82. Matsch also permitted testimony with respect to the notion that some of the
victims did not die instantaneously, but rather "died painfully as gravel and other
debris from the falling nine-story structure filled their lungs." Serrano, supra note 82.
In addition, Matsch allowed "photos of maimed survivors, pictures of victims being
wheeled into hospitals and testimony from the coroner about the various causes of
death." Fleeman, supra note 82.
86. Gorner, supra note 81.
87. See id. "They could see we were all physically and mentally exhausted," re-
marked one reporter. "Every one of the jurors cried. Reporters found themselves
hugging each other for solace, sobbing, saying they couldn't take it any more." Id.
(quoting Maurice Possley of the Chicago Tribune). "We were barely able to compre-
hend it. We couldn't wrap our minds around it. We were getting snapshots of a few
people, but we knew that for every one of them up there on the stand, there was a
score of them who weren't there." Id.
88. See Gibeaut, supra note 46, at 42.
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III. Evaluating the Prejudicial Impact of Victim Impact
Statements in Light of the History of the Death Penalty
and the Constitutional Rights of the
Capital Defendant
VIS primarily are supported on grounds of fairness to the vic-
tim.89 It repeatedly has been argued that because a defendant may
introduce mitigating evidence to inform the jury about his or her
character, the State must likewise be granted the right of fair re-
sponse. 9° VIS, by their nature, grant victims a new voice in the
criminal justice system which can remind the capital sentencer that
they also are individuals whose deaths touched the lives of many.
Accordingly, victims claim that VIS rectify the imbalance pervad-
ing criminal courtroom proceedings by allowing them to partici-
pate in the prosecution of the defendant.91 Advocates further
contend that VIS allow the victim a means of coping, closure, and
recovery,92 as well as encourage cooperation between the prosecu-
tor and the victim. 93
VIS, however, have not escaped constitutional challenge and de-
bate, especially with respect to their potential violation of the con-
stitutional rights of the capital defendant.94 VIS primarily are
criticized because they replace the rational process of imposing a
death sentence with arbitrary and capricious jury discretion.95
Many opponents argue not only that the emotional nature of VIS
89. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. But see Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 859 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This argument is a classic non sequitur:
The victim is not on trial; her character, whether good or bad, cannot therefore consti-
tute either an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance.").
91. See Phalen & McClellan, supra note 37, at 12 (stating that the movement also
"seeks to provide victims with a greater role in the criminal justice process"); see also
Oberlander, supra note 35, at 1625.
92. See supra note 39.
93. See McLeod, supra note 39, at 504-07 (noting that VIS help victims regain
control over their lives, enhance system efficiency by encouraging cooperation of wit-
nesses, and also fulfill the victim's desire for retributive justice).
94. See supra note 25; see also infra note 95.
95. See William Hauptman, Note, Lethal Reflection: New York's New Death Pen-
alty and Victim Impact Statements, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 439, 475-76 (1997)
(noting that "[t]he most commonly voiced objection to victim impact statements is the
inherent possibility that they violate a defendant's right to equal protection"). "When
our society is choosing which heinous murderers to kill and which to spare, its gaze
ought to be carefully fixed on the harm they have caused and their moral culpability
for that harm, not on irrelevant factors such as the social position, articulateness, and
race of their victims and their victims families." Id.; see also Mulholland, supra note
35, at 746 ("Arguably, victim impact statements inject an arbitrary factor in deciding
whether to impose the death penalty").
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"impermissibly inflame and prejudice the jury, '9 6 but that the relia-
bility of VIS is suspect because they "are difficult to verify and im-
possible for the defendant to rebut. '97 Others hold that VIS are
unfair because they value some lives more than others and uncon-
stitutionally punish defendants for things which they could never
have foreseen. 9 It also has been argued that their appeal to juror's
emotions undermines the Supreme Court's command that the deci-
sion to impose the death penalty should be reasoned and morally
sound, not discretionary and wanton.99 Finally, it is fair to contend
that courtrooms are not designed for the coping of the victim, and
that the trial and conviction of the defendant is, in and of itself, an
adequate vindication of the victim's rights.
A. The Payne Decision Reconsidered
Despite criticism and dissent, the victims' rights movement has
gained momentum and nationwide support. 100 A majority of juris-
dictions now permit VIS, 10 and Congress has codified Payne's ba-
sic legal tenets.0 2 Moreover, popular sentiment favors the death
96. Mulholland, supra note 35, at 747.
97. Id. ("A defendant's sentence should solely be based on the severity of the
crime and the defendant's record, not on the emotional impact of the victim's
family.").
98. See generally Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934); State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 175 (N.J. 1996).
99. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (following the holding of
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971) that "where discretion is afforded a sentenc-
ing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be
taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to mini-
mize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action"). The Court further noted
that the punishment "must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain," and "must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." Id. at
173; see also Gibeaut, supra note 46, at 42; infra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 35.
101. See Mulholland, supra note 35, at 742 (noting that "[miost jurisdictions, includ-
ing ... the District of Columbia and the federal court system, are closely aligned with
the United States Supreme Court decision in Payne and permit victim impact state-
ments from the victim's family regarding the impact of the victim's death on the
family").
102. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D); see also supra notes 40-52 and accompany-
ing text; Mulholland, supra note 35, at 735 n.29 (citing UNIF. R. EVID. 404 (a)(2)
(amended 1986) (emphasis added)). The Uniform Rules of Evidence, which are more
restrictive than the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, also provide:
(E)vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim offered by an ac-
cused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character
trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide
case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor (is admissible
for the purpose of providing that the victim acted in conformity with his
character on a particular occasion).
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penalty,1"3 and victims' rights advocates have proposed a victims'
rights amendment to the Constitution. 104 If VIS are going to be an
intrinsic part of the criminal justice system, however, then it must
be determined how they will be used, so as to minimize any risk of
prejudice to the capital defendant.
While the Payne Court did hold that VIS were not an Eighth
Amendment violation, the Court did "not hold.., that victim im-
pact evidence must be admitted, or even that it should be admit-
ted."'01 5 In fact, the Court noted that VIS could be inflammatory in
certain instances and thereby unduly prejudice the defendant.'0 6
What the Court failed to consider, however, is where to draw the
line between the admissible and the inflammatory and in what
manner the courts may draw it. Although the Court apparently
was confident that this was a detail best left to the discretion of the
trial judge on a case-by-case basis,0 7 the blatant inconsistencies
and troublesome discrepancies between the McVeigh and Tim-
UNIF. R. EvID. 404(a)(2) (amended 1986). Moreover, "(a)s crime has increased it is
not illogical to believe that the trends for a more active role of the victims will in-
crease." Anderson, supra note 35, at 402 (noting that "[p]olitical pressure on judges,
prosecutors, and other elected officials to recognize the need for victims to participate
in the punishing of the offender will continue to have a profound effect on all aspects
of the criminal justice system").
103. See supra notes 16-17.
104. See supra note 38.
105. Payne, 501 U.S. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. Justice O'Connor notes:
The possibility that this evidence may in some cases be unduly inflammatory
does not justify a prophylactic, constitutionally based rule that this evidence
may never be admitted .... If, in a particular case, a witness' testimony or a
prosecutor's remark so infects the sentencing proceeding so as to render it
fundamentally unfair, the defendant may seek appropriate relief under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. Moreover, O'Connor states that "[tihat line was not crossed in this case," yet fails
to define what exactly that line is. Id.
107. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (holding that "[a] State may legitimately conclude
that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's
family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty is
imposed"). But, in ruling that such evidence should be treated no "differently than
other relevant evidence is treated" the Court seems to leave the door of admittance
open to the discretion of the particular trial judge. Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion lends further support to this notion. See id. at 831 (noting that "[tirial courts
routinely exclude evidence that is unduly inflammatory"). In other words, if the judge
chooses to admit the VIS, the Eighth Amendment will not render it unconstitutional;
however, if the evidence is found to be so unduly inflammatory that its admittance
would prejudice the jury against the defendant, then the judge has the option of ex-
cluding it. See id. And, in the event that the trial is rendered "fundamentally unfair,"
as a result of admitting prejudicial victim impact evidence, then the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can provide a means of relief. See id. at 825.
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mendequas sentencing hearings reveal the inherent danger of such
ambiguity.1 °8 Accordingly, if the use of VIS is to continue, it must
be strictly regulated.'0 9
1. Comparing Payne to Prior Supreme Court Death
Penalty Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court consistently has held that "the penalty of
death may not be ordered automatically, arbitrarily, irregularly,
randomly, capriciously, wantonly, freakishly, disproportionately or
under any procedure that permits discrimination by race, religion,
wealth, social position or economic class."' 0 For the application of
the death penalty to be constitutionally valid, the procedure must
carefully protect against passion or prejudice."' Thus, in an effort
to shield the capital sentencing proceeding from the foregoing
prejudices, "the Supreme Court has mandated that the sentencer
be given specific guidelines which will direct and limit the sen-
tencer's discretion.""' The sentencer must weigh the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in making a reasoned determina-
tion.1 3 Moreover, the death penalty process must ensure individu-
108. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
109. The Court seems to deny the fact that VIS significantly alter traditional sen-
tencing procedures, in stating that "[v]ictim impact evidence is simply another form or
method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the
crime in question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing authori-
ties." Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. In this respect, the Court is rather disingenuous.
110. See United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1487 (D. Colo. 1996) (noting
that "(flour separate opinions were filed in support of the judgment in Gregg v. Geor-
gia ... that a sentence to death for murder under a new sentencing scheme adopted
by the Georgia legislature was not an unconstitutional punishment"). While the
Supreme Court has accepted the death penalty as constitutional, individual justices
continue to struggle with an exact articulation of the their views "about the impera-
tives of a valid procedure in the many subsequent decisions approving and disapprov-
ing variations in state laws governing the extreme punishment of death." Id. "They
have been more clear in stating what is prohibited than what is required." Id.; see also
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (holding that the death sentence must be
"suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capri-
cious action"); accord South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810 (1989). Cf. En-
mund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII & XIV.
111. See McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. at 1487.
112. Thomas G. Myrum, State v. Paz: Adoption of the Harmless-Error Standard of
Review for Capital-Sentencing Errors, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 375, 376 (1990/1991).
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (1995). At the sentencing hearing, any information
relevant to the sentence may be admitted, including any mitigating or aggravating
factor considered under § 3592. See id. The defendant may present any information
relevant to a mitigating factor, and the government may present information relevant
to a mitigating factor, for which notice has been provided for under 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3593(a). See id. While there is some degree of variation with respect to how states
qualify such "aggravating" circumstances, the aggravating factors must be "objectively
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alized consideration of each defendant and allow the jury to
consider both the circumstances of the crime, as well as the defend-
ant's character.114 Accordingly, when making the very serious de-
provable and rationally related to the criminal conduct in the offenses proven at
trial." McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. at 1487. "The aggravating factors function to focus the
jury's attention on the particular facts and circumstances pertinent to each defendant
found guilty of an offense punishable by death in the context of mitigating factors
unique to him as an individual human being." Id. at 1488. In essence, they serve to
aid the jury in distinguishing "those who deserve capital punishment from those who
do not ...." Id. (citing Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993)); see also U.S.C.
§ 3593(a)(2) (1995) (setting forth the aggravating factors that the government, if the
defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a death sentence).
The factors for which notice is provided under this subsection may include
factors concerning the effect of the offense on the victim and the victim's
family, and may.include oral testimony, a victim impact statement that iden-
tifies the victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss
suffered by the victim and the victim's family, and any other relevant
information.
18 U.S.C. § 3593. Aggravating circumstances often include such factors as the murder
of a public official or a law-enforcement officer, murder for hire, or an especially cruel
or heinous felony murder. See Rich Henson, 3 Men, 3 Convictions; What Happened?,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 15, 1997, at A3, available in 1997 WL 3238466 (noting that legal
experts say that aggravating circumstances usually must be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt, as opposed to mitigating circumstances, which need only be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence). If no aggravating factor is found to exist, then "the
court shall impose a sentence other than death authorized by law." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3593(d) (noting that "[a] finding with respect to any aggravating factor must be
unanimous").
With respect to "mitigating" circumstances, the Supreme Court has mandated that
the defendant has the constitutional right to present all relevant mitigating factors
that could support a sentence less than death. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1392(a) (West 1997)
(listing all mitigating factors which the finder of fact shall consider in determining
whether a sentence of death is justified). Such factors include: "impaired capacity;"
"duress;" "minor participation;" "equally culpable defendants;" "no prior criminal
record;" "disturbance;" "victim's consent;" and, "other factors in defendant's back-
ground, record, or character or any other circumstance of the offense that might miti-
gate imposition of the death sentence." Id. at §§ (a)(1)-(8); see also, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3593(c) (mandating that "the burden of establishing the existence of any mitigating
factor is on the defendant, and is not satisfied unless the existence of such a factor is
established by a preponderance of the information"); McVeigh, 944 U.S. at 1487 (stat-
ing that "[t]here can be no limitation on the ability of individualized jurors to consider
mitigating factors"); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982).
114. See Myrum, supra, note 112, at 376-77; see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
879 (1983) (stating that a jury must make an "individualized determination" as to
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, based on "the character of the
individual and the circumstances of the crime"); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801; Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 281 (1976) (noting that "[t]he respect for human
dignity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of aspects of the
character of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as
a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of imposing the ultimate punish-
ment of death").
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termination whether to execute the defendant, the jury must "focus
on the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein[g].' 9M 5
Before the Payne Court's ruling, the decision to impose the
death penalty was applied universally and dispassionately. 16 Any
evidence that did not inform the jury about the character of the
crime or the character of the defendant was automatically disre-
garded."7 Under the confines of such a controlled standard, each
defendant was equal in the eyes of the sentencer 118 The Payne
decision, however, marked a deviation from traditional procedures,
in an eager attempt to grant the victim a higher degree of equality.
This effort to balance the rights of the victim with those of the
defendant, however, comes with a hefty price. Although the "uni-
queness" of the victim, his or her character and reputation, the vic-
tim's family, and the emotional impact of the crime are presented
to the'jury, there is a grave risk that some victims' lives will be
valued more than others.119 Moreover, the victim impact evidence
creates a "'tactical' 'dilemma' for the defendant because it allows
the possibility that the jury will be so distracted by prejudicial and
irrelevant considerations that it will base its life-or-death decision
on whim or caprice. "120
2. The Payne Decision's Troublesome Implications
VIS, by their nature, focus on the victim's uniqueness-a notion
that represents a complete departure from the traditional focus on
the defendant. Although this departure may be warranted, both by
society and the ideals of justice, 2' it is gravely important not to
violate the constitutional confines of rational and moral sentencing
115. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at
304 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). "[I]t is the func-
tion of the sentencing jury to 'express the conscience of the community on the ulti-
mate question of life or death."' Id. (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
519 (1968)).
116. See Staples, supra note 17, at A26 ("In the interest of equal justice, the same,
dispassionate standard was to be applied to every crime and to every defendant,
whether rich or poor, criminal or upstanding, loved or despised.").
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 866 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (as-
serting that "[t]he fact that each of us is unique is a proposition so obvious it requires
no evidentiary support"). In fact, "[s]uch proof risks decisions based on the same
invidious motives as a prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty if a victim is
white but to accept a plea bargain if the victim is black." Id.
120. Payne, 501 U.S. at 864 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Booth, 428 U.S. at 506-
507).
121. See generally supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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procedures in doing so. The justice system simply cannot allow ar-
bitrary and prejudicial factors to constitute the means of VIS, re-
gardless of the importance of the ends of protecting victims' rights.
It is untenable to permit a decision as grave as the death penalty to
"turn on the perception that the victim was a sterling member of
the community rather than someone of questionable character.' '1
22
The Supreme Court merely danced around this issue in Payne,
stating that victim impact evidence "is not offered to encourage
comparative judgments of this kind," but rather to reveal "each
victim's 'uniqueness as an individual human being,' whatever the
jury might think the loss to the community resulting from his death
might be."'21 3 This argument ignores the vulnerability of human
emotions. Thus, the Court failed to address the troublesome impli-
cation of allowing emotionally laden factors, such as the circum-
stances of the victim's death, the community's recollections of the
victim's benevolence, or the degree of emotional distress suffered
by the family, to be included in the VIS. 124
Recall the emotional roller coaster of the McVeigh sentencing. 25
The sobering tales and gruesome memories of the victims were
painful enough for any juror to hear, but when coupled with the
graphic and horrific details recalled by rescue workers, police, and
coroners, the grief became simply too much for any human to han-
dle. 126 Certainly no juror could have been expected to set emo-
tions aside and make a decision based on reason alone. The
alleged purpose of VIS is to grant victims a voice, by which those
victims may cope and obtain closure. 27 At no point throughout
the entire course of the victims' rights movement, however, has
anyone advocated the need to grant bystanders a voice. Thus, the
testimony admitted by Judge Matsch from witnesses, such as the
police and coroners, was completely unwarranted and provided an
122. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506 & n.8 (stating that "[w]e are troubled by the implication
that defendants whose victims were assets to the community are more deserving of
punishment than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy").
123. Payne, 501 U.S. at 823.
124. Perhaps the Court overlooks the fact that we, as human beings, are by nature
all unique individuals, no matter what our position in society may be. Certainly any
member of the jury can well recognize such a notion without the aid of detailed de-
scription by the victim's family. "What is not obvious, however, is the way in which
character or reputation in one case may differ from that of possible victims," and
where evidence that dwells on a victim's social status is admitted to prove such differ-
ences, some victims are consequently rendered more deserving of protection and life
than others. Payne, 501 U.S. at 866 (Souter, J., dissenting).
125. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text; see generally id.
127. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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even greater imbalance to the capital sentencing hearing. 128 To
open the door to testimony by professionals who have chosen to
routinely interact with crisis situations serves only to unduly preju-
dice a jury that has already heard the testimony of the victims
themselves. Accordingly, Judge Matsch's lack of control over the
sentencing hearing completely undermined McVeigh's constitu-
tional protections and rendered the jury's decision to impose the
death penalty both arbitrary and capricious.
In McVeigh's case, the heinousness of his crime made the out-
come fairly predictable, but in countless other cases VIS could be
the defining line between life and death.129 Without a more con-
trolled and uniform employment of VIS, their use becomes troub-
lesome and highly prejudicial. This result was not expected by the
Payne Court, and does not constitute a reasoned and moral appli-
cation of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.130
3. Proposals to Limit Payne
To permit anything less than controlled and uniform procedures
for admitting VIS is potentially to open a "'Pandora's box' of pos-
sibilities for a prosecutor seeking the death penalty."'1 31 Consider
the ramifications of a sentencing hearing that permits evidence,
such as the victim's resume, diary, funeral eulogy, poetry, art work,
pictures, and trophies, as well as tales by the victim's family of their
loved one's goals, dreams, and aspirations. Moreover, imagine the
admission of testimony from people that the victim assisted emo-
tionally and economically as a result of volunteer work, or patients
of the victim's medical practice who would testify to the victim's
ability to save lives, or even fellow parishioners of the victim's
church who would recall the victim's regular attendance and heart-
felt generosity. Absent more narrowly defined guidelines or crite-
128. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 18.
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (dictating that "cruel and unusual punishments"
should not be inflicted); see also supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text; Payne
501 U.S. at 824 (noting that "[w]here the State imposes the death penalty for a partic-
ular crime, we have held that the Eighth Amendment imposes special limitations
upon that process").
131. Anderson, supra note 35, at 405. Imagine just how far the line could be
pushed. See id. (noting that the prosecutor might attempt to submit "work perform-
ance evaluations, recorded testimonials, funeral eulogies, or even a high school report
card, in an effort to demonstrate the loss to the family and community"). It doesn't
take much of an imagination to fathom what the future might hold if the reigns of
admittance are not tightened severely. McVeigh's sentencing might only have been
the beginning, rather than the extreme.
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ria from the Supreme Court, Congress, or state legislatures, there
exists too grave a potential that the Payne holding will be improp-
erly interpreted.132
Although proponents of VIS put forth a number of "compelling
arguments, ' 133 the fundamental concern underlying the movement
for victim participation is human emotions.13 1 Most victims may be
132. See Lee v. State, 942 S.W.2d 231, 236 (Ark. 1997) (allowing VIS by the victim's
sister describing the painful experience of selecting the victim's wig for the funeral);
Hicks v. State, 940 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Ark. 1997) (Brown, J., concurring) (permitting
into evidence a 14 minute silent videotape, accompanied by a family member's tearful
narration, that contained approximately 160 photographs spanning the entire life of
the victim). While more than 60 of the photos depicted stages of the victim's life from
when he was a toddler up to his marriage and birth of two children, another 70 or so
were dedicated to the lives of his two sons, tracing their growth from infancy to adult-
hood, and the remaining pictures ranged from "family events, such as Thanksgiving
dinner, to the victim's involvement with various aspects of the carnival business." Id.
But see Ledbetter v. State, 933 P.2d 880, 890 (Okl.Cr. 1997) (finding error in admitting
portions of a VIS that "described the murder as a 'selfish act;' related one child's
opinion that his mother was 'butchered like an animal,' and recalled one child's mem-
ory that Appellant had threatened to kill the victim and 'somehow I knew in my heart
he meant it'"). Despite such a ruling, however, the Ledbetter court held that the
survivor's opinion that the death penalty was an appropriate sentence was not im-
proper. See Ledbetter, 933 P.2d at 891. Cf. Conover v. State, 933 P.2d 904, 920 (Okl.
Cr. 1997) (holding that the admitted VIS tipped the scales too far in favor of the
prosecution). The court rendered statements such as the victim was "butchered like
an animal," that the defendant was a "parasite" and "murderous animal" failed to
"shed any light on the victim's life or the impact of the loss of the victim to his fam-
ily." Conover, 933 P.2d at 920-21 (stating that "such statements are inflammatory
descriptions designed to invoke an emotional response by the jury"). Moreover, the
court found that the VIS which described the victim as a baby, his childhood, and his
parent's dreams and hopes for his future "in no way provide insight into the contem-
poraneous and prospective circumstances surrounding his death; nor do they show
how the circumstances surrounding his death have . . .impacted a member of the
victim's immediate family." Id. at 921. As such, the commentary was deemed to have
been more prejudicial than probative and thus outside of the permissible scope of
victim impact evidence. See id. at 920. The case was remanded for resentencing be-
cause of the trial court's failure to provide the defendant with his right of confronta-
tion; thus, the actual effect of having improperly admitted such prejudicial victim
impact evidence was addressed only in dicta. See id. See also State v. Tucker, 478
S.E.2d 260, 267 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1561(1997) (admitting photographs dur-
ing sentencing hearing so as to depict "shots to Victim's head and that they were fired
at close range," as well as color photos "to show the difference between the blood
Victim coughed up and the blood from her wound"). In addition, the sentencing
judge admitted photos of "Victim at different places on vacation, Christmas decora-
tions in Victim's yard, Victim holding her godchild, and Victim fishing." Tucker, 478
S.E.2d at 27 (holding that such victim impact evidence was admissible to show the
victim's uniqueness and that nothing shown by the photographs would render the trial
fundamentally unfair).
133. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 89-93.
134. Anderson, supra note 35, at 399 (noting that "[e]motional considerations and
recognition of the victim's personal suffering play a major role ... ").
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motivated to tell their story out of a sincere desire to attain closure.
However, what if the victim instead is motivated by spite? 135 It is
often difficult to tell exactly where the victims' motivations lie, and
the judicial process should not be jeopardized by allowing
America's courtrooms to become a dwelling place for bloodthirsty
revenge. 136 The death penalty cannot bring back the dead, nor is
its purpose to serve in the interest of vengeance. 37 Wounds that
cut as deep as these never will be healed by the death of another. 138
135. One commentator noted that "[t]here is also a calculated judgment that the
sentencer who hears from the victim or the victim's family will find the victims suffer-
ing more reason to hold the defendant responsible and thus will sentence more strin-
gently." Id. at 400 (citing Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV.
1411, 1416 (1993)). Others asserted that opening the door to VIS "marks the resur-
gence of vengeance by victims and families through the criminal justice system since
direct participation in the courtroom provides an alternative to vigilante justice." Id.
136. The pain and suffering which victims' families endure as a result of their loss is
no doubt extreme, but America's courtrooms are not a place for emotional outbursts
and inflammatory comments. As one observer noted:
Until quite recently, bereavement brought a period of reflection. But over
the last decade, the solemn activity of mourning has become a raucous and
public blood sport. In the television age anguish only seems real when
broadcast over the airwaves .... The bereaved now hold regular press con-
ferences, as did Ronald Goldman's father almost every day of the O.J. Simp-
son trial. Elsewhere, family members leave the courtroom with high fives
and fists in the air as though sentencing someone to death were no more
serious than a football game. I understand the depth of the pain and the
desperate quest for relief. But the judicial system and courtroom were
meant for a different purpose entirely.
Staples, supra note 17.
137. See Hauptman, supra note 95, at 479 (noting that "vengeance is an inappropri-
ate rationale for allowing the use of victim impact statements"). "Vengeance is pure
anger manifested by uncontrollable, prejudicial outbursts. This leads to dispropor-
tionate sentencing which hinges on the eloquence (or mere presence) of family mem-
bers." Id.
138. See Wallechinsky, supra note 16 (article exploring why a minority of victims'
families actually oppose the death penalty for the very people who murdered their
loved ones). Bud Welch's daughter, Julie Marie, was a victim of the Oklahoma bomb-
ing. See id. He recalls a conversation he had once shared with his daughter about the
death penalty and their mutual opposition to it. See id. He admits wavering, how-
ever, after Julie's death because he was consumed by rage and hate. See id. (stating
that "[tihe first half year after the bombing, had I known that McVeigh was guilty, I
would have been for his execution"). As time passed, however, Welch's outlook al-
tered. He recalled:
[A]fter time, I was able to examine my conscience, and I realized that if he is
put to death, it won't help me in the healing process. People talk about
execution bringing 'closure.' To hell with 'closure.' My little girl is not com-
ing back, and that's for the rest of my life.
Id. Celeste Dixon is another victim who opposes the death penalty. See id. (noting
that she started to feel sorry for the man who killed her mother). She comments:
There's a tendency in victims' support groups and within prosecuting attor-
neys' offices to make people feel that they are being disloyal to the person
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
That is simply not the nature of the healing process, and it is not
the purpose or the intent of the criminal justice system. 139 The law
is not a form of therapy, but rather, a means of justice.
The Eighth Amendment dictates that reason, morals, and preci-
sion must reign supreme.140 Thus, a means must be developed for
granting the victim a voice that does not capitalize on inflam-
matory and emotional factors or unduly sway the jury with wrench-
ing tales of sorrow and pain. Under proper guidelines, VIS should
contain no more than a general description of the victim. Any
statements dealing with social status, religion, and political beliefs
should be prohibited because they serve no more than to capitalize
upon the jury's emotions and preconceived ideals. Moreover, com-
mentary about the victim's funeral and gory, distasteful details or
characterizations of the crime itself should be exempt on the
grounds that such statements open the door to passion and preju-
dice.141 In addition, any opinions regarding the death penalty, ap-
propriate' sentencing, or the defendant must be barred on the
grounds that they are irrelevant to the decision of whether or not
to impose the death penalty, as well as prompt irrational and emo-
tionally charged decision-making.
B. Minimizing the Prejudice of Payne by Imposing a Set of
Stringent and Uniform Guidelines
The Payne Court's ambiguity regarding the proper procedures
for admitting victim impact evidence during a capital sentencing
trial is troublesome. While the interests of the victim are impor-
who died if they don't want the murderer to die. They're led to expect that
the murderer's death is going to help them heal. It doesn't. All it does is
make them focus on anger and hatred. After the execution, the object of
their hatred is gone, and they still haven't dealt with their grief.
Id., at 4-5.
139. "Sentencing in criminal cases is said to serve all or part of four purposes:
(1)retribution; (2)deterrence; (3)incapacitation; and (4)rehabilitation." Hauptman,
supra note 95, at 478.
140. See supra note 110-112 and accompanying text; see also U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII (mandating against the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments"); supra
note 99.
141. One need not be a "bleeding-heart liberal to be wary of injecting too much
emotionalism into death penalty cases." Cathy Young, Let's Keep the Focus on the
Perpetrator of Crime, DET. NEWS, June 24, 1997, at A7, available in 1997 WL 5590501.
While the suffering of those affected by the heinous crime is indeed something we
should consider, it is crucial to remember that "we differentiate degrees of homicide
not according to the victim's pain or the survivor's grief, but according to the intent
and the moral culpability of the perpetrator, and that's where the focus should re-
main." Id.
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tant, a death sentence free from passion or prejudice must remain
the primary concern. When the decision whether to execute a per-
son is based on arbitrary factors, inflammatory comments, or an
appeal to juror emotions, the death penalty is no longer being ap-
plied objectively or reasonably. It thus follows that VIS demand
the most .stringent, controlled, and narrowly defined means of reg-
ulation possible given their potential to render a capital defend-
ant's trial fundamentally unfair. Assuming, therefore, that a
majority of courts will continue to use VIS, it is necessary to deter-
mine how courts can apply them in a manner which least prejudices
the defendant's right to a trial free from passion and prejudice.
1. Proposed Procedural Safeguards
In order to prevent a decision as grave as sentencing a human to
death from resting on arbitrary, subjective, and capricious factors,
a test no less restrictive than strict scrutiny is demanded.14 z From a
constitutional perspective this is crucial because fundamental rights
mandate the highest judicial scrutiny.143 And, the right to a capital
sentencing hearing free from passion and prejudice is fundamental
because the Eighth Amendment has consistently been interpreted
to guarantee such a right.1 4 4 Accordingly, the means employed to
achieve this kind of justice must be directly related to the state's
compelling interest in ensuring that right.145
Improperly employed VIS can violate a defendant's fundamental
rights. Thus, their use must adhere to a very stringent set of guide-
lines that should be expressed in a constitutional amendment,146
142. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that "all
racial classifications, imposed by federal, state, or local government actor, must be
analyzed by strict scrutiny"). The same analysis would apply to capital sentencing
hearings; for rights at risk here are equally fundamental. In fact, no right could be
more fundamental than the right to life. As such, nothing short of strict scrutiny
should apply. "The strict scrutiny standard analysis requires that the legislative pur-
pose be so compelling as to justify the means utilized." 20 N.Y. JUR. 2d Constitutional
Law § 356 (1982). In other words, the ends must be narrowly tailored to the ends.
143. See id. (noting that "classifications affecting fundamental interests... are sub-
ject to the strict scrutiny test").
144. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text; see also ); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 228 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Robin-
son v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); United States v. McVeigh, 944 U.S. 1478,
1487 (D. Colo. 1996) (noting that "the procedure must protect against a decision mo-
tivated by passion and prejudice").
145. See supra note 142; see also 16A AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 750 (1979)
("Statutes affecting fundamental constitutional rights must be drawn with precision
and must be tailored to serve their legitimate objectives . . ").
146. The process of achieving an amendment is not an easy one. Under Article V
of the Constitution, the process does not even begin unless "two-thirds of both
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thereby ensuring that the law will be applied fairly and consist-
ently. By incorporating victims' rights into the "supreme law of the
land," '147 all judges and courts will be compelled to comply with
minimum requirements. Moreover, the procedure of admittance
should be clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for abuse of
discretion, thereby reducing the costs of frivolous appeals.
The procedural safeguards outlined by the New Jersey Supreme
Court provide the best starting point for establishing a universal set
of guidelines because they address the needs of the victim, while, at
the same time, protect the defendant's constitutional rights. 48 In
fact, the sentencing of Jesse Timmendequas was a perfect example
of how such safeguards effectively can control passion and preju-
dice. 49 Timmendequas' gruesome crime certainly had the makings
for a wrenching sentencing hearing.1 50 Forced to comply with the
state's requirements, however, Mr. Kanka controlled his emotions,
and his testimony granted the jury only a small peek into the life
that was destroyed.151 The VIS did not capitalize on the suffering
of the victims, but still reminded the jury that they were dealing
with human beings. Moreover, despite the court's limitations, it
was inevitably clear that the defendant's actions caused an inno-
cent family incredible suffering. Mr. Kanka's testimony thus ac-
complished all that was ever desired by victims' rights advocates,
without jeopardizing the defendant's right to a sentencing free of
arbitrary and capricious factors.
Houses propose an amendment, or if the legislatures of two-thirds of the states call
for a constitutional convention." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
75 (3d ed. 1996). Furthermore, in order for the amendment to be adopted, it must be
ratified by three-fourths of the states. See id. It should be noted that this amendment
may also be used as a template for state statutes. Nonetheless, I am proposing a
constitutional amendment because that is the direction things are heading. See Mc-
Murry, supra note 38 (setting forth the contents of the current proposal). For the sake
of administrative convenience, it seems most logical to adhere to this current trend,
given that if passed, the law would apply universally to all states, as opposed to pro-
posing that all fifty states adopt identical statutes.
147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (holding that "the particular phra-
seology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle
... that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument").
148. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 74.
151. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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2. Proposal for a Constitutional Amendment
The following proposal for an amendment to the United States
Constitution establishes guidelines and procedural safeguards to
effectively minimize the risk of prejudicing the jury against the cap-
ital defendant. 15 2
The trial judge, because of her familiarity with the case, knowl-
edge of and respect for the law, and inherent authority to control
and provide a fair courtroom, is in the best position to undertake
the balancing test outlined by the following guidelines:
Section 1. The victim impact statement first must be written out
and submitted to the judge for approval. The testimony may
relate to the impact of the victim's death on his or her immediate
family. It may also contain general commentary about the vic-
tim, such as education, age, employment, and family.'53 More-
over, the VIS must adhere to the following standards:1 54
[1] It can be no more than 2 pages, double-spaced.
[2] It can make absolutely no reference to or opinions about
the death penalty or appropriate sentence.
[3] It can express no feelings or opinions about the defendant.
[4] It must refrain from making any characterizations about
the circumstances of the crime.
[5] It must not assert any comment about the victim's moral
views or religious affiliation.
[6] It must be void of overtly emotional or inflammatory
comments.
[7] It must avoid all commentary that touches upon the vic-
tim's social status or political beliefs.
152. The proposed amendment relies heavily upon many of the concerns of the
New Jersey Supreme Court. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
153. This prong closely adheres to the language of Payne. The Payne Court held
that "evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's
family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should
be imposed." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
154. With respect to subsections [2] and [3], however, the Payne Court refrained
from deciding the constitutionality of such commentary. See id. at 832-33 (O'Connor,
concurring). But see Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987) (holding that such
information "can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from
deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant").
Moreover, the Booth Court noted that the admission of such "emotionally charged
opinions ... is inconsistent with the reasoned decisionmaking we require in capital
cases." Id. at 508-09; see supra note 25.
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Section 2. The probative value of the victim impact evidence
must not be substantially outweighed by its risk of undue preju-
dice to the capital defendant or confusion to the jury.' 55
Section 3. If admissible under Sections 1 and 2, only one
spokesperson may speak to the jury on behalf of all victims.
That person must be over the age of eighteen, unless no other
survivors are available to testify. In such an event, admissibility
will then be left to the discretion of the trial judge. The testi-
mony shall take the form of reading from the pre-approved
statement, and the designated reader shall refrain from crying or
showing any overt signs of emotion. The judge will warn the
designated reader of this requirement beforehand. If there is a
problem controlling emotions, the prosecutor will be appointed
to read the statement.
Section 4. The VIS shall be read only if the defendant opens the
door to character evidence by introducing mitigating evidence at
the sentencing.
Section 5. The defendant shall be forewarned that if he or she
chooses to introduce mitigating evidence, then the government
will likewise have the opportunity to introduce evidence about
the character of the victim by way of VIS.
Section 6. Defense counsel shall be given timely notice of the
government's intentions to present victim impact evidence and
the name of the victim who will testify. Defense counsel may
interview the witness beforehand and cross-examine the witness
at the sentencing hearing.156
Section 7. Any comments by the prosecution during summa-
tion, with respect to the victim impact evidence, should be
strictly limited to the previously heard testimony.
Section 8. In response to the reading of the VIS, the judge shall
give the jury a limiting instruction. The jury shall be ordered to
155. This prong essentially mirrors the language of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which holds: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
156. The prospect of cross-examining a witness is not appealing. Consider the
ramifications of attacking the character of the grieving widow or the reputation of the
suffering parent. The mere possibility of causing the witness more pain and anguish
seems to render cross-examination a far too risky endeavor for the defense attorney,
especially given the likely response of the jury. Nevertheless, as a matter of due pro-
cess, the defendant is entitled to a rebuttal of the evidence offered against him or her.
See Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (opin-
ion of Stevens, J.) (due process requires that defendant be given a chance to rebut
presentence report)).
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make a reasoned and moral judgment, and not be swayed by
emotions or sympathy. The judge shall remind the jury that
while emotions are indeed powerful, a death sentence cannot be
motivated by vengeance, and emotions cannot be a factor in de-
termining a sentence. In addition, the judge shall note that VIS
are designed to give the jury a small glimpse into the life of the
victim and the suffering that his or her death imposed on the
survivors. However, the full extent to which the victim's survi-
vors have suffered cannot be the grounds for determining the
defendant's moral culpability. The jury shall concentrate on the
circumstances of the crime and the defendant's record in making
a sentencing determination.
3. Discussion of Amendment
The above guidelines do not require the jury to first find evi-
dence of one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt before
considering the VIS, as the New Jersey Supreme Court does, be-
cause such mental gymnastics are well beyond the comprehension
of a lay juror.157 Thus, if the defendant opens the door to such
evidence, the jury may consider it. In addition, the above proposal
strictly limits the victim impact testimony to one survivor, while the
New Jersey Supreme Court leaves the door open to "special cir-
cumstances." '158 Given the high potential of undue prejudice that
can result from days of heart-wrenching testimony, there can be no
room for discretion on the part of the sentencing judge to allow
157. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. By invoking such a limitation,
New Jersey seeks to prevent VIS from becoming "a means of weighing the worth of
the defendant against the worth of the victim." State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164,
179 (N.J. 1996). And, in essence, that is exactly what this Constitutional Amendment
is trying to prevent. However, New Jersey's means of achieving this goal is somewhat
thwarted; for once the jurors hear the VIS, it will be virtually impossible for them to
forget what was said should they not unanimously find the existence of an aggravating
factor. See id. While the Muhammad Court maintains that "[t]he entire structure of
the penalty phase of capital cases is premised on the belief that jurors will use evi-
dence only for its proper purpose," it is unlikely that emotionally laden testimony of
this nature could ever be completely ignored, especially given the weakness of human
emotions. See id. Perhaps the New Jersey Supreme Court overlooked the fact that
juries are not typically comprised of trained legal professionals, but rather lay persons
whose knowledge of and experience with the law is minimal. The risk that the jurors
will misuse the VIS is significant; thus, any effort to impose such complex rules is in
vain. Given the likelihood that the other narrowly defined guidelines will counter any
risk of prejudice, the VIS may therefore be considered whenever the defendant opens
the door to such evidence.
158. See Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 180. The Court fails to specify what such circum-
stances may be; however, the mere possibility of an exception to the rule creates the
inherent danger of a slippery slope.
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statements from more than one survivor. Finally, at the conclusion
of the victim impact testimony, the judge also will be required to
give a limiting instruction as to the extent of the testimony's use in
order to temper the effect of human emotions. The instructions are
to remind jurors of the goals of sentencing and the higher ideals of
the justice system, in order to prevent them from reaching a deci-
sion based on fleeting emotions.
These guidelines are not inconsistent with the Payne decision.
They merely clarify its ambiguities and ensure that VIS are prop-
erly employed. The Payne Court noted that "(t)here is no reason
to treat such evidence differently than other evidence is treated,
159
and thus, VIS, like all other evidence, must be susceptible to tests
of relevance, reliability, and prejudice. Although the traditional
focus on the defendant may have shifted, the Payne Court did not
rule that VIS are exempt from the traditional admissibility stan-
dards for evidence. 6 °
Conclusion
In many cases, VIS have the potential to make a marked differ-
ence between life and death. Faced with the inconsistent state of
the law after Payne, efforts must now be directed towards control-
ling the prejudicial impact of VIS, in order to avoid unduly preju-
dicing defendants in capital sentencing hearings. An amendment
to the United States Constitution is the most adequate protection
against the influence of passion and prejudice. The gravity of the
sentence demands such uniformly stringent control, and the rights
already defined by the Constitution compel nothing less. By apply-
ing the safeguards set forth by these guidelines, courts throughout
the United States can avoid inconsistent, capricious, and arbitrary
decisions. To permit otherwise would be to run the impermissible
risk of tipping the scales of justice, thereby denying the possibility
of equality in the courtroom.
159. Payne, 501 U.S. at 826.
160. See id.; see also supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
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